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Abstract. Validity is an enduring theme in the information systems (IS) domain. However, 
because much of that discussion draws, at least nominally, on an Empiricist orientation, 
formulating issues of validity in a way that is pertinent to a practice-oriented discipline has 
been difficult. This is particularly true for external validity, which refers to the applicability, 
or relevance, of research to phenomena in the broader environment of practice, but also for 
measurement, ecological, and internal validity, all of which are needed to establish rigor in hu-
man-centred practical research. We argue that critical realism presents a number of insights 
that profoundly clarify a discussion of validity in practice-oriented theory-testing research. 
We reformulate the notions of theory testing and research validity from the critical realist 
perspective and illustrate new insights gained using a discussion of a controlled experiment. 
 
Keywords: Critical realism, validity, hypothesis-testing, theory.
1 Introduction
Ensuring that research is valid is an enduring theme in the information systems (IS) domain, 
as evidenced by the large number of articles in our premier journals that focus only on that 
topic (King and He 2005; Klein and Myers 1999; Lee and Baskerville 2003; O’Leary-Kelly and 
Vokurka 1998), and the amount of column space in more conventional theory-testing articles 
that purports to demonstrate that the work is valid in some way. A significant amount of this 
research uses a quantitative hypothesis-testing approach with a heavily positivist slant. That style 
Accepting editor: Margunn Aanestad
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of research typically discusses validity at some length, arguing that the measures, the sampling 
strategy, and the data analysis are all valid in some way, and that the results apply beyond the 
sample of observations reported. 
Discussions are nevertheless challenging; we argue that the challenge stems from certain 
inherent contradictions and inconsistencies associated with the traditional approach to assess-
ing validity issues in theory-testing research. For information systems, which is principally a 
practice-based research domain, there is the further problem of ensuring that research provides 
insight into problems faced by the community of practitioners. This is particularly true for ex-
ternal validity, which refers to the applicability, or relevance, of research conducted in contrived 
or bounded research situations to phenomena in the broader environment of practice, but it is 
also (to varying extents) true of measurement, ecological, and internal validity, all of which seek 
to establish the rigor of human-centered practical research.
Within each study, researchers have to be aware that human agency must be accounted for 
in any explanation of the operation of an information system because system processes and out-
comes will be influenced by the goals of the people who build and operate that system. In other 
words, research into systems-related issues is complicated because the operation of the system, 
unlike a natural force, is not independent of the conceptions of the people who use and are 
governed by the system. This added complexity, we will argue, is most problematic for research-
ers who adopt a rigorous empiricist stance when describing how validity issues are satisfied. The 
impoverished nature of that philosophy has resulted in IS researchers and writers making ad hoc, 
modifications to the empiricism, arguably because the practice orientation of IS seems to require 
a more realist approach to sciences and social sciences, but these are only partly convincing be-
cause they are generally not derived from a consistent theoretical base. 
In this paper we aim to show that new clarity can be brought to the formulation of the tradi-
tional validity issues of theory-testing research in IS by explaining the fundamental principles of 
each issue in the language of the critical realist philosophy of Bhaskar (1978; 1993; 1998a), Say-
er (1992), Collier (2011), Archer (2013), and others. Critical realism is increasingly discussed 
in IS as a grounding philosophy for research methodology that both breaks with hard empiricist 
approaches and accepts the epistemological criticism of the interpretivists, while still retaining a 
realist ontology suited to scientific research (e.g., Tsang 2013; Volkoff and Strong 2013; Wynn 
and Williams 2012). Having these properties means that this research philosophy should pro-
vide a robust basis for clarifying methodological issues in theory-testing research. Our focus on 
validity issues in theory-testing research adds to the growing body of literature on the research 
process from a critical realist perspective, including how critical realism resolves inconsistencies 
between the ontological assumptions and research practices of much IS research (Smith 2006), 
how it informs the research question or focus of IS studies (Dobson 2002), and the process of de-
veloping and refining theory, particularly in system evaluation studies (Carlsson 2003; Carlsson 
et al. 2010), how it can be used to improve the rigor of case study research (Wynn and Williams 
2012) and why diversity in data gathering and analysis methods is desirable (Mingers 2004a). 
We understand that most current IS researchers would probably reject the strong form of 
empiricism that we describe by way of example throughout this paper. Actual research practice 
and pedagogy already incorporate many of the insights that we find follow from a critical realist 
perspective (Dobson 2002; Mingers 2000; Smith 2006). Our point is that these extensions lack 
an adequate philosophical foundation so long as empiricism continues to be the framework used 
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for their exposition. This is especially true for questions of validity. Our thesis is that critical 
realism provides such a precise alternative foundation.
Our argument proceeds as follows. In the next section we outline briefly the epistemology of 
empiricism. The goal here is not to present a detailed critique of that philosophy; rather, we wish 
to demonstrate the poverty of this position for discussion of research validity. We then outline 
critical realism to identify how this position allows the problems of theory testing and research 
validity to be reformulated with new clarity, with that approach systematized in the following 
section. Building on these principles, we describe a hypothetical controlled experiment that il-
lustrates the theoretical analysis and explicates the steps that might be taken to ensure and justify 
validity according to the new critical realist formulation. We conclude with a summary of the 
significance of our arguments and their broader implications. 
2 The standard empiricist view of theory testing
Enquiry in the natural and social sciences is influenced heavily by the empiricist world view, 
which holds that all valid knowledge is empirical and so ultimately derived from sensory expe-
rience (Hooker 1975). Hume’s scepticism, to the effect that no knowledge can be established 
conclusively by reason alone, has been particularly influential in the development of scientific 
methods (Fogelin 1993), and is the foundation for the hypothetico-deductive approach that is 
so prevalent in the natural and social sciences (Rosenberg 1993). 
Logical positivism is an extreme extension of empiricism that rejects all claims of knowledge 
except those derived empirically. On this view, because the only meaningful form of knowledge 
is empirical (and ultimately derived from the sensory experience that informs direct knowledge), 
the ultimate aim of science is to maximize empirical knowledge (Hooker 1975). In keeping with 
Hume’s view that what we think of as a causal relationship is merely a regularity in perceptions 
(a constant conjunction of events), a statement that one event causes another is equivalent to 
saying that one event is always followed by another. Under this highly influential world view, 
causation cannot be proved, so the proper role of theory is for predicting patterns based on 
objective observations.
Theory testing, from an empiricist standpoint, finds its ultimate expression in Popper’s falsi-
ficationism (Popper 1959), which holds that because we can never prove a theory definitively, a 
scientific hypothesis must be evaluated in terms of whether it is actually false. Theory-testing, on 
this view, means assessing observational evidence to determine whether (1) observations are con-
sistent with an a priori hypothesis, and (2) this correspondence is systematic and unable to be 
explained plausibly by chance factors alone (the null hypothesis). This model of theory-testing 
is illustrated in figure 1, which shows the relationship between the empirical and theoretical 
domains under that paradigm. Note that the diagram is a more nuanced view of the research 
process than is possible using Hume’s modern empiricism, and is (arguably) a reflection of the 
neo-empiricist view of research (see Greenwood 1990).
The shortcomings of this philosophy, particularly that it tolerates only an impoverished 
view of the world, have been dealt with at length (Klein and Lyytinen 1985; Kolokowski 1972; 
Mingers 2004a; Smith 2006; Williams 1975), and so are not the focus of our discussion. For 
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the purposes of this discussion, however, two points should be noted regarding figure 1. Firstly, 
on a strict reading of empiricism, only empirical and theory categories enter the empiricism 
paradigm. Limiting the objects of enquiry in this way implies that the objective of science is 
merely to gather and predict data, and not to explain at any deep level the mechanism that ena-
bled those experiences (because nothing beyond experience can be analysed validly). Secondly, 
limiting the research focus to a comparison of experience with theory means that measurement 
validity, internal validity, ecological validity, and external validity must all be primarily con-
cerned with empirical issues. 
Measurement validity, for the empiricist, is primarily concerned with attributes of the data, 
especially statistical bias, coherence, and differentiation. Under that view, measurement validity 
is established by demonstrating, for example, that parts of the measure are consistently related 
to other measures that are conceptually similar, and distinct from measures that are conceptually 
dissimilar.
Internal validity is concerned with showing that there is a constant conjunction between 
particular observations and events. For an experiment, this means demonstrating that any dif-
ference in the events measured is systematically related to changes in the variable being studied, 



























of study more generally
Operationalises 
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and that the constructed environment forms a closed system by virtue of the experimental con-
trols. To the extent that closure can be demonstrated, differences in the pattern of observed event 
sequences can be attributed to the research intervention.
Ecological validity is an acknowledgement that human activities are situated in, and influ-
enced by, particular contexts. From the empiricist’s perspective, because research is focused on 
events and measures, it is important that the environment of the study (including the look and 
feel of stimuli) corresponds to a natural setting because results should then reflect the outcomes 
that should occur in that natural setting. 
External validity is whether the researcher can “infer that the presumed causal relationship 
can be generalized to and across alternate measures of the cause and effect and across different 
types of persons, settings, and times”(Cook and Campbell 1979). Applying a pattern or rule to 
settings beyond those that have been observed is problematic from an empiricist perspective, 
however, because the reasoning process required (applying observations to unobserved phe-
nomena) violates fundamental principles of empiricism. Specifically, empiricism requires the 
assumptions of any model to have been tested empirically before being included in that model. 
However constructing any argument about the validity of assumptions outside of the specific 
data set examined (or other known data sets) ultimately requires the use of inductive reasoning, 
a form of analysis that empiricism regards as invalid because the validity of inductively derived 
assertions cannot be tested directly through observation. 
The limitations of the empirically-centered conception of validity are highlighted in the dis-
cussion of this issue in some positivist-oriented IS literature. For example, Lee and Baskerville’s 
(2003) lengthy discussion about non-statistical forms of generalizability essentially proposes 
pragmatic workarounds to some of the serious validity constraints that a strict empiricist ap-
proach imposes on a practice-focused discipline. Also see various critiques on validity-related 
issues in research (Boudreau et al. 2001; Klein and Lyytinen 1985). 
From these discussions and the standard definitions of validity terms presented, it is clear 
that:
1. Measurement validity is problematic in IS research because many of the things we would 
like to measure, such as system usefulness or system success, have socially constructed or 
experiential aspects, and there is no direct way to assess the correspondence between a 
measure and a behaviour. Moreover, in circumstances where it is possible to observe an 
outcome, as with actual use of a technology, there is often a close relationship between 
data, measures, and constructs. In this situation, there is a tendency to conflate a trait 
with the test for that trait (assuming that a variable used in analysis exists in the world), 
resulting in its theoretical properties being defined in terms of data values (Bunge 2006; 
Mingers 2003). An example from the IS domain is usefulness. There is no obvious way to 
observe usefulness, particularly each individual’s socially constructed understanding, so 
the design of the measure is critical for gaining access to the underlying reality. However, 
one cannot simply use a Likert-type scale with some concepts thought to be related to 
usefulness, run factor analysis, and keep the items that display high levels of convergent 
and discriminant validity. There is no guarantee, using such an approach, that the items 
actually measure the concept of interest, even if they are intercorrelated and empirically 
distinct from other measures. If we instead base our assessment on observation of what 
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someone does when using a system, we then run into the problem of separating a test 
for usefulness from our observations of system outcomes. 
2. Internal validity is an apparently straightforward concept in experimental studies, but 
relies on demonstrating that the study environment is a closed system with respect to 
the manipulations. The problematic aspect of internal validity is not that it is difficult 
to achieve, but rather that measurement and effect tend to be conflated, leading to a 
lack of differentiation between a stimulus (or manipulation) and the underlying reality 
represented (Bunge 2006).
3. Ecological validity is problematic to the extent that research results are regarded as un-
reliable unless the environment of the study mimics a typical setting for the activities 
studied. In other words, a specific naturalistic setting is needed in an experiment to 
demonstrate that a particular regularity can occur in the so called real world setting 
modelled. A more subtle problem is that, even when a setting is made naturalistic, the 
precise operational definitions demanded by a philosophical emphasis on empirics can 
so deplete a setting (the instance of practice modelled) of its richness and texture that it 
all but disappears (Madill et al. 2000). 
4. The epistemological status of external validity is problematic for researchers in a practice-
focused discipline, such as IS. Because our focus is on informing practice, we typically 
collect data about events in order to build theories and make recommendations that are 
potentially of assistance to practitioners. A limited set of environments is available to 
us in any given project, of course, but lessons drawn from the data are rarely restricted 
to just what was observed. Indeed, an important test of the success of any theory is 
whether it is useful for solving related (but non-identical) technology-related problems 
or assisting with managing resources in other (unobserved) environments. Empiricism 
falls short, because it does not really allow for the type of reasoning required to make 
the generalizations about the applicability of assumptions to unobserved objects that is 
required for a researcher to claim external validity (Lucas 2003).
Studies of the actual methods used by researchers in the information systems, management, 
and social psychology disciplines indicate widespread departures from strict empiricist require-
ments, creating an implicit tension between ideal and actual practice, whereby researchers claim-
ing to follow an empiricist tradition are unable to explain some of their research practices in 
strict empiricist terms (see Bealer 1992; Maddy 1992; Smith 2006). In information systems 
research in particular, these differences indicate that critical realism may be a more appropri-
ate formulation of what information systems researchers actually believe and practice (Mingers 
2004b; Smith 2006). The realist position we expound in the next section illuminates this issue, 
and provides a set of conceptual tools that help address many of the problems that IS research-
ers have trouble dealing clearly with from the espoused empiricist position. In addition, by 
reformulating validity using a sophisticated realist philosophy we are able to demonstrate that 
validity is not primarily an empirical issue. Note that our description of the basic principles of 
critical realism is limited to the terminology that is strictly relevant to this work. For a more 
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general primer on the critical realist philosophy as it relates to information systems see work by 
Mingers (Mingers 2004b; Mingers et al. 2013). 
3 Brief outline of critical realism
Bhaskar’s philosophy of critical realism (Bhaskar 1978; 1998a), as its name suggests, is a realist 
philosophy, which is to say that it claims that a world outside and independent of our conscious 
perception exists, and that only some aspects of this world are objectively knowable via our 
senses. Our senses are not completely reliable, of course; for example, we can be fooled by il-
lusions. Nevertheless, because reality is independent of our senses, even when we misperceive 
an event, the occurrence and properties of that event are independent of our perception and 
understanding, and the cause of the event operated even if we were not aware of its operation.
This distinction between what happens and what we perceive, and between an event and the 
underlying (but possibly unobservable) mechanism that caused that event, are the key aspects 
of critical realism that we will explore here. In the language of critical realism, they form three 
strata of reality: the real domain, the actual domain, and the empirical domain. The actual do-
main is the easiest to describe. This is the domain of events: someone forms an intention to sell 
shirts via an Internet-based store, a consumer visits that store, and so on. 
The empirical domain is what people can experience. Things in the actual world, such as 
events cannot be perceived, but events leave empirical traces including perceptions. That is, the 
sensing of an event is not the same as the event, which may occur regardless of whether we can 
sense it. In addition, the subjective and perspectival nature of perception means that experiences 
will vary from one person to another and across settings. 
According to critical realism, behind events are structures and generative mechanisms that 
have enduring properties. In non-technical terms, a generative mechanism is the causal power 
that gives rise to something, or the reason that something is (Bhaskar 1993). The hierarchy of 
ontological categories, then, is that enduring generative mechanisms and structures are part of 
the overarching category of the real. These mechanisms and structures instantiate actual events 
(and possible non-occurrences of events), which leave empirical traces that can be observed or 
otherwise experienced. Therefore, mechanisms, events, and experiences are all real. Events and 
experiences are also actual (because they are particular occurring instantiations of the genera-
tive mechanisms), but because experiences are obtained via empirical traces of actual things, 
experiences are also empirical. The nested relationship between these three domains of the real, 
representing the stratified ontology of critical realism, is illustrated in figure 2, derived from 
Mingers (2004b, p. 94).
From the critical realist perspective, understanding the real domain is the proper role of 
science. To develop theory, from this perspective, is to explain why an event occurs, but from a 
transcendental perspective. That is, the focus is not usually on the specific event observed, but 
on what that event tells us about enduring underlying causal relationships (generative mecha-
nisms) that lie beyond common experience (the empirical domain). Scientific investigation, on 
this view, involves manipulation of the environment to trigger or manipulate the operation of 
a generative mechanism in order to produce particular actualised outcomes. For example, a re-
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searcher could manipulate the environment surrounding a particular class of decision process to 
answer the questions why would someone want to buy a shirt online, and what makes a shopper 
select one online vendor in preference to another? Further, because critical realism distinguishes 
between the cause, the event, and data about that event, any causal explanation must explain 
patterns of events independently of any particular event or data about that event. In the lan-
guage of critical realism, these causal forces are known as generative mechanisms.
To explain the nature and workings of a generative mechanism, critical realism asks the 
researcher to use retroductive reasoning. Retroduction, also sometimes referred to as abduc-
tion, is a mode of reasoning in which the cause of an event is inferred, based on the question 
‘what must the world be like for the event to be possible?’ and the converse, ‘what must the 
world be like for the event to not be possible?’ The explanation may in fact be incorrect, but it 
is nevertheless a useful starting point for more analysis in which new data is gathered and the 
explanation retested. The objective of this type of reasoning is to determine an explanation for 
observations, particularly with a view to identifying the circumstances without which those 
observations cannot exist, based on the assumption that nature’s uniformity is not the result 
of accidental regularities, but rather a consequence of the existence and operation of underly-
ing mechanisms and structures (Sayer 1992, p. 158). Bhaskar (1978) argues that retroduction 
describes the iterative approach actually used to develop most theories in the sciences and social 
sciences because it involves looking deeply into (or behind) observed patterns or regularities to 
discover what produces them. 
With this background we can now see how this philosophical orientation applies to objects 
of knowledge in the natural sciences, where an event and empirical traces of that event can 
be explained and predicted by a generative mechanism. Knowledge, under this philosophical 
paradigm, is accumulated by the iterative process of identifying systematically the entities re-
sponsible for an event, proposing a generative mechanism (via retroductive reasoning), testing 
that theory, and repeating all or part of that process to address shortcomings (Bhaskar 1978). 
These principles also apply to the social sciences where the objects of enquiry are socially 
constructed entities, such as language, society, and social capital. The transitive nature of the 
structures examined there (compared to the intransitive structures examined in the natural sci-
Real Mechanisms and structures with
enduring properties
Actual Events (and non-events) that are
generated by the mechanisms
Empirical  Traces of events actually perceived
(observed / experienced)
Figure 2. The stratified ontology of critical realism, after Mingers (2004a, p. 94)
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ences) creates a number of ontological and epistemological issues. For example, ontologically, 
social structures do not exist independently of their effects, are localized in time and space, and 
only hold for particular contexts; and epistemologically, social science is self-referential in the 
sense that like the phenomena studied, it is a social practice (Mingers 2004a). However, these 
structures nevertheless exist independently of the researcher and the research activity, and are 
causal and therefore real. The job of the social scientist therefore, is to explain the nature and 
operation of these social structures, objects, and generative mechanisms. 
In a practice-based discipline, such as IS, explanation of phenomena relevant to members of 
the community is similarly required to develop and advance the shared and specialised body of 
knowledge that informs activities. This means that an explanation of how a given variable could 
have influenced a practice-relevant event is needed (e.g., why a lack of top management support 
may lead to implementation problems), not just a description of empirical relationships, par-
ticularly given that empirical relationships may only apply in a limited range of circumstances 
(and in some cases may merely be statistical anomalies). In fact, practice-based disciplines are 
arguably at least as dependent on the type of deep explanations demanded by critical realism 
as scientists and social scientists because practice activities are informed by a body of abstract 
knowledge that (at least in part) is derived from enquiry in the social and natural sciences.
4 Implications of critical realism for theory testing in 
IS
The three-fold stratified ontology just presented, differs substantially from both positivism and 
interpretivism, the dominant espoused research paradigms in the information systems discipline 
(Smith 2006), but also offers profound insight into the nature of the research activities we, as a 
practice-oriented discipline, undertake. We will now describe how the principles of critical real-
ism assist our understanding of validity issues in research.
4.1 Principles that assist our understanding of validity issues
We identify four principles of critical realism, summarised in table 1, that help to clarify what 
constitutes valid research. Firstly, critical realism distinguishes the generative mechanism from the 
operation of that mechanism in specific circumstances. In other words, events are caused by the op-
eration of mechanisms, and are no less real than the mechanisms that cause them, but they are 
ontologically distinct. The types of events that we investigate in the information systems domain 
tend to be social phenomena (e.g., IS success and failure). This means that a given outcome, say 
a decision to abandon an IT infrastructure project, is distinct from the underlying mechanism, 
which we might call the project failure mechanism, and which can result in both successful and 
unsuccessful outcomes depending on the specific circumstances of a project. 
Secondly, critical realism distinguishes between theory and the generative mechanism that the 
theory describes. This distinction between the theory and the generative mechanism to which 
it refers is the key to understanding how the implications of critical realism for theory testing 
9
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and validity differ from those of empiricism. Both theories and the generative mechanisms they 
describe are real. Each generative mechanism has particular causal powers that are activated 
under specific conditions, and may produce quite different outcomes for different conditions 
(e.g., conditions can determine whether a system implementation project is a success or a fail-
ure). The theory of the mechanism, inferred via retroductive reasoning, postulates relationships, 
structures, and causal powers that are capable of producing a given effect, and when that effect 
will be triggered. 
The third principle is that critical realism distinguishes between an event (e.g., a decision or 
outcome) and our perception of that event. For example, the rating of a seller on an online store is 
distinct from the rater’s perception of the event, and also distinct from how anyone else sees or 
otherwise experiences the event. Data about that event gathered via a questionnaire is, of course, 
also distinct from the event itself. Our perceptions and the data that we access concerning an 
event are, in critical realism terminology, empirical traces. In the same way that events produced 
by a generative mechanism may differ from each other, empirical traces may differ from one oc-
currence of an event to another as may different traces of even the same event.
The fourth principle is that critical realism uses an iterative and retroductive reasoning process as 
the basis for theory development. Our understanding of the underlying cause of an event is always 
provisional because our reasoning process is fallible. Under the retroductive mode of reasoning, 
the key question posed when formulating a theory about the nature of the process that leads to 
a given of event is “what must the world be like for this phenomenon to be possible.” As the dis-
cipline evolves, some theories will be corroborated, and others will be abandoned. Work by Ho-
vorka (Hovorka et al. 2012; Hovorka et al. 2013) shows, in a striking visual format, the myriad 
tests of relationships between concepts in the IS field. Within the theory domains identified, a 
number of relationships show regular evidentiary support, while others have failed to achieve 
such support. Similarly, Hirschheim and Klein (2012) describe changes in how information 
systems development issues have been conceptualised and investigated throughout the history of 
the IS discipline, including the realisation that development issues can be more readily explained 
using a sociological perspective than is possible with the more technically-focused perspective 
used in the 1970s. 
 Principle 1 Critical realism allows a distinction between generative mechanisms and the actual events that they cause in particular circumstances.
 Principle 2 Critical realism allows a distinction between a theory and the generative mechanisms (causal influences) that the theory describes.
 Principle 3 Critical realism allows a distinction between the actual events and the empirical traces of these events which we can observe or experience.
 Principle 4
Critical realism requires an iterative research process based on retroductive reasoning 
in which the central question is “what must the world be like for this phenomenon 
to be possible” 
Table 1. Principles of critical realism for discussing research validity
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4.2 How these principles inform theory testing
These principles require that the role of theory testing is to assess the extent to which a theoreti-
cal account is consistent with what is known about a phenomenon observed in the IS prob-
lem domain, and indeed, the set of possible actual events in the domain of interest. However, 
because generative mechanisms, events, and empirical traces of those events are ontologically 
distinct, three types of theory (often conflated) must be distinguished when describing theory 
testing using a realist stance: a mechanism theory, an event theory, and a measurement theory. 
The relationship between each theory type and the operation of a mechanism in the world is 
illustrated in figure 3. Each is described in turn and explicated, first referring to user acceptance 
of IT concepts, and then to planetary motion (from the domain of cosmology) to show how 
the same theoretical structure is broadly applicable across both the natural and social sciences.
Mechanism theory
Mechanism theory proposes an explanation for how a mechanism is actualised as an event. For 
example, in the user acceptance of IT domain, researchers would like to explain the generative 
mechanism responsible for acceptance, and so explain all possible instantiations of the accept-
ance mechanism. The theory is derived, using a retroductive reasoning process, from a consid-
eration of what the world must be like for the user acceptance to be possible. For example, each 
user acceptance theory is always subject to revision because the acceptance generative mecha-










The empirical traces of 




The nature of an 
event in a domain
A method for gathering 
the empirical traces 
needed to
obtain insight into the 
events occurring in a 
domain
Structures, mechanisms, 
and processes that are 
relatively time and space 
invariant.
The mechanism acting in 
particular conditions/ 
circumstances. May not 
produce identical events 
at different locations in 
space and time.
World
Figure 3. The relationship between theory and the three domains of the real
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the objective is always to explain a relationship between the real and actual layers. This can be 
stated more specifically as: mechanism theory is a testable description of how a given generative 
mechanism described can be triggered to cause the actual events that constitute the research 
problem domain to which the theory applies (See figures 2 and 3). 
The approximate equivalent in cosmology to our user acceptance example is that the task of a 
theory of gravity is primarily to show how a certain conception of gravity explains the planetary 
orbits, not the position of the points of light we see in the sky (although it does that too). The 
empirical observations of the celestial positions of the planets is how we gain access to the actual 
orbits. 
Event theory
An event theory describes the nature of events in a domain. This type of theory does not specify 
a specific measure or indicator, but instead characteristics of an event and how they give insight 
into the process that unfolds to cause the event. For example, a user acceptance of IT event theory 
would describe the characteristics of acceptance. 
Like other types of theory, as the discipline evolves, some event theories will survive while 
others are abandoned. Marakas et al. (2007) describe this process in their account of how, as our 
understanding of underlying mechanisms has matured, our conceptualisation of the nature of 
the computer self-efficacy construct has changed along with our understanding of how it gives us 
access to IT usage phenomena. In cosmology, the equivalent development is the gradual refine-
ment of theory describing the nature and properties of orbits, and how those properties reveal 
aspects of the operation of the underlying mechanism. Specifically, Tycho Brahe’s empirical data 
on planetary trajectories in the night sky was the basis for Johannes Kepler’s painstaking work in 
which he developed his three laws of planetary motion. Those laws describe the characteristics of 
orbits according to mathematical principles, and are a cornerstone of Newton’s theory of grav-
ity. In terms of our discussion, Newtonian gravity is a mechanism theory, while Kepler’s work, 
which describes the characteristics of planetary motion, is the event theory.
Measurement theory
The relation between events and their empirical traces is the focus of the final type of theory, 
measurement theory. In the stratified ontology of critical realism, empirical traces are onto-
logically distinct from the events that produce them. This type of theory, therefore, proposes a 
method for gathering the empirical traces (data) needed to obtain insight into the events occur-
ring in a domain. Unfortunately, for those wishing to conduct research, empirical traces are not 
neatly labelled and clearly bound to a single event. So a trace can have different meanings (or no 
meaning) depending on the context. For example, a standard measure of perceived usefulness 
“Using the application would increase my productivity” (based on Davis 1989, p. 340), poten-
tially has no meaning outside of the largely utilitarian work context. A measurement theory 
should explain the relationship between context and measure, and the limits of that relationship, 
so that the meaning of a given trace in the particular context of the study is clear. Through the 
cumulative tradition of research into a topic, some measurement theories will be abandoned, 
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and others will be enhanced. Marakas et al. (2007) describe a number of ways in which measures 
of computer self-efficacy have improved over time to describe the concept more effectively, but 
also show that the efficacy of some measures has degraded over time. The underlying concept 
exists independently of the conceptualisation, but the historical transformation has rendered 
some measures, or at least aspects of them, inadequate.
In the cosmology discipline example, initially the measurement theory was a set of geometric 
techniques for using earth-bound directional information on celestial bodies to reconstruct a 
three-dimensional orbit. However, new measurement techniques have been introduced recently, 
such as the use of Doppler redshift to assess the distance and velocity of distant celestial objects, 
and of lasers to track the lunar orbit. Visual recording has been supplanted by the new meas-
urement techniques because it is conceptually and empirically inadequate. Underpinning each 
method is a theory of measurement that explains how we make use of specific empirical traces 
to provide information on the events of interest.
4.3 Implications of critical realism for validity
How theory is developed and tested, as implied by critical realism’s stratified ontology, therefore 
differs in important ways from those considered valid under the empiricist view of the world. 
One important consequence of these differences is that, to some extent at least, concepts of 
validity in research are turned on their head compared to the empiricist’s view. 
Measurement validity
Measurement validity refers to how well a measure gives information about the thing it is de-
signed to measure. For an empiricist, measurement validity refers to the statistical characteristics 
of set of observations about the construct (e.g., variance, skewness, kurtosis, and so on) and the 
connection between a measure and a theoretical concept. This form of validity is assessed us-
ing statistical methods such as the multitrait-multimethod matrix (Campbell and Fiske 1959), 
which calculates convergence and discriminance scores, and factor analysis (Spearman 1904), 
which uses the clustering of correlations of responses as a way to assess consistency with a theo-
retical concept. 
For a critical realist, empirical qualities are only important insofar as they give information 
about the actual events occurring in the laboratory. In other words, validity is not primarily a 
property of the data, but a logical assessment of the relationship between data and event. Mak-
ing a measurement validity claim involves assembling a chain of evidence about the quality of 
information the measurement gives about events. As a consequence, measurement validity is not 
just concerned with purely empirical issues, such as whether the data is biased, but also more 
conceptual issues, such as whether the measure is adequate to detect traces of the event.
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Internal validity
Internal validity, for the empiricist, refers to whether observed changes can be uniquely at-
tributed to the research intervention (other influences are accounted for primarily by exclusion 
from the setting, randomisation, or measurement) in which a number of treatments or stimuli 
are presented, and responses or results from each compared. Quoting Cook and Campbell’s 
classic definition (1979, p. 37), it “refers to the approximate validity with which we infer that 
a relationship between two variables is causal or that the absence of a relationship implies the 
absence of cause.” This form of validity is assessed using a deductive process on the basis of three 
criteria (Cook and Campbell 1979):
1. the presumed causal event precedes the effect recorded (temporal precedence),
2. the cause and the effect are statistically related (via covariation), and
3. there is no plausible alternative explanation for the conjunction of events.
For the critical realist, generative mechanisms are ontologically distinct from the patterns 
of events, so internal validity is concerned with more than events and their conjunctions. In-
ternal validity, on this view, is a retroductive analysis of whether the study allows the researcher 
to identify the mode of operation of natural structures, mechanisms, or processes (that the 
researcher does not produce) using events and measurements (that the researcher does produce) 
(see Bhaskar 1998b, pp. 9-11). That is, if the objects of research activity are structures and gen-
erative mechanisms, how meticulously the researcher controls the events in the laboratory is a 
necessary but not sufficient basis for determining the internal validity of a study, because the re-
search procedures and events produced alone do not make research activities intelligible. For the 
critical realist, therefore, internal validity is concerned with establishing a chain of evidence that 
the generative mechanism is a possible cause of the events occurring in the study or laboratory. 
When the experimental procedure has high internal validity, we are able to distinguish between 
events and the operation of the structures, mechanisms, or processes that produce the events, 
and which are the real objects of the experimental investigation. 
Ecological validity
The term ecological validity, as used in the information systems discipline, refers to the repre-
sentativeness of the design, or whether the setting of an experiment mimics the look and feel of a 
natural environment in the specific domain of practice being studied (see Bronfenbrenner 1977; 
Kelly et al. 2010; Vance et al. 2008). Used in this sense, ecological validity is really only relevant 
for investigations of environment-specific behaviours such as we find in a practice-oriented dis-
cipline like IS. For example, people do not, as a matter of course, draw UML diagrams of data-
bases. Because that behaviour only happens in quite specific conditions, a study will be regarded 
has being ecologically valid to the extent that the closed system constructed to study how people 
construct UML diagrams resembles the sort of open system found in practice. 
Critical realism, by making a higher-level ontological distinction between causal mecha-
nisms and events, views this type of validity rather differently. Making this distinction allows 
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us to recognise that executing a study in a naturalistic setting is not done to support an infer-
ence that a given constant conjunction of data exists in the natural setting modelled. Instead, 
when investigating the generative mechanisms that determine outcomes related to practice, the 
environment should be as naturalistic as possible to help ensure the created environment is not 
either activating a different generative mechanism to what we would expect to find in practice, 
or activating the right generative mechanism in an atypical way.
Ecological validity, when viewed through this lens, is the strength of evidence that the theo-
rised mechanism for a phenomenon in the domain of practice was activated in the research en-
vironment in a way that is reflective of practice. Ecological validity is therefore related to internal 
validity, and can greatly enhance internal validity, although a study can show internal validity 
without demonstrating ecological validity. 
External validity
Finally, although for the empiricist, external validity is a contentious concept, it is nevertheless 
generally conceptualised, following Cook and Campbell (1979, p.37), as “the approximate va-
lidity with which we can infer that the presumed causal relationship can be generalized to and 
across alternate measures of the cause and effect and across different types of persons, settings, 
and times.” In a sense, it is an assessment of how readily a presumed cause-effect relationship 
found can be extrapolated to the set of studies that we did not execute. When a study has no 
external validity, the effect found is specific to that study, making it impossible to generalize 
from the study’s specific measures of particular observations made in particular circumstances to 
other measures and other situations. 
External validity is commonly assessed in terms of statistical bias in sample descriptive vari-
ables. For example, Jiang et al. (2000) in a validation of the SERVQual instrument claim that 
their findings have acceptable external validity because there is no systematic bias in the size of 
organisations surveyed, the distribution of SERVQual gap responses is not biased, and an analy-
sis of variance calculations found no systematic bias from any demographic variable, including 
age, gender, managerial position, and experience. From that analysis, the authors conclude that 
the SERVQual metric appears to capture user perceptions of service quality accurately and can 
therefore provide to managers deep insight into firm performance across multiple dimensions 
of service quality. 
From a critical realist perspective, such a conceptualisation is bogus, because it conflates the 
empirical traces with the event, and the event with the mechanism. The critical realist view of 
external validity, therefore, is that it concerns the evidence that the generative mechanism that 
caused the actual events in the research setting also operates outside of the specific domain of the 
research. Evidence to support external validity claims includes being able to explain previously 
unexplained actual events beyond the research setting via the proposed generative mechanism. 
Ecological validity is sometimes confused with external validity. However, in critical realist 
terms, external validity deals with the operation of the generative mechanism in contexts that 
were not studied, whereas ecological validity deals with the manner in which the generative 
mechanism relevant to a particular practice was activated.
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The overall objective of assessing these four forms of validity, for the critical realist, is to 
establish a chain of evidence that the theorised generative mechanism can be said to cause the 
actual events in the problem domain and the empirical traces purportedly generated by those 
events. If we can establish all four forms of validity, we can be said to have tested theory, which 
is to show that we assessed the operation of the generative mechanism as described in our theory, 
and can therefore explain the operation of that mechanism in situations outside of the specific 
(laboratory) setting of the study. These issues can also be extended to research approaches that 
are not laboratory-based (such as a survey, field experiment, or positivist case study) by interpret-
ing the term laboratory to mean the bounded and (semi-)controlled domain of empirical data 
collection. The conceptual differences between the empiricist and critical realist interpretations 




Whether the statistical properties of 
the measure show that the measure is 
unbiased related to similar measures, 
and unrelated to measures that should 
be dissimilar.
Evidence that the measurement gives 




Whether observed changes can be 
attributed to the research intervention 
rather than other possible influences.
Evidence that the particular proposed 
generative mechanism and only that 




The extent to which the environment 
constructed (the methods, materials 
and setting) corresponds to a natural 
setting outside of the laboratory where 
the effect being examined is believed 
to occur.
Evidence that the theorised 
mechanism for a phenomenon in the 
domain of practice was activated in 
the research environment in a way that 
is reflective of practice.
External 
validity
The approximate validity with which 
we can infer that the presumed causal 
relationship can be generalized to and 
across alternate measures of the cause 
and effect and across different types of 
persons, settings, and times.
Evidence that the mechanism that 
causes the events in the research 
environment causes events outside of 
the specific domain of the research.
Table 2. Concepts of validity under empiricism and critical realism
It is particularly worth noting the new clarity that this formulation gives to external validity. 
On this view devising a research procedure to empirically test research hypotheses derived from 
theory is merely a stratagem for manifesting the purported generative mechanism in the con-
trolled environments of the laboratory. But the task of showing that this generative mechanism 
also explains the actual events in the broader research domain (often incorrectly referred to as 
the real world) is no longer primarily concerned with the limited empirical traces of these actual 
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events as they might manifest in that broader domain, but rather, about showing that the broad 
phenomena to be explained by the research are actually explained by the same mechanism that 
were invoked in a contrived and controlled way in the laboratory.
5 Exemplifying the validity issues
To exemplify our principles, assume that a researcher notices that whenever an experienced 
programmer is hired to work on a mobile device application for a fixed fee, the quality of work 
seems to vary according to whether the programmer is paid before or after delivery. The re-
searcher then engages in a retroductive reasoning process, based on an understanding of practice, 
in which theory is developed to answer the question “what must the world be like for program-
ing quality differences to manifest according to the payment terms of a contract?” Note that 
the meaning of quality here is based in the understanding and practice of the discipline, and 
the wider problem also necessarily refers to practice and indeed is part of the social process of 
knowledge development in the community of practitioners (Sayer 1992, pp. 14-15) Through 
this process, the researcher eventually theorises that the operation of an individual’s internal and 
unobservable effort-reward system (the real mechanism) is affected by the method used to pay 
for the work. 
To test this theory, the researcher designs a controlled experiment to compare outcomes 
from a group that is prepaid with one that is paid after completion. This design includes a 
measure of whether the trigger occurred (e.g., that the payment method is understood) and 
procedures to disambiguate the event from other parts of the environment. This experiment 
proceeds as follows:
1. We design a development task that requires use of the software, and two payment meth-
ods.
2. We take two groups of programmers with approximately equal ability.
3. We explain to each person the task requirements.
4. We ask each person to complete the set task and pay according to the rules for that 
group.
5. We observe development behaviour and collect measures of behavioural outcomes for 
each programmer in each group so that we can assess whether the event of interest oc-
curred (differences in program quality), and how it occurred. 
Note that, according to critical realism, observing which events occur and determining why 
is the main point of the exercise, not testing hypotheses per se. In addition, having a priori 
theory is not critical except that, in experimental research, one cannot normally ensure that the 
environment will trigger the event of interest without a strong theoretical base. Recording ob-
servations first and then finding they are explained by a theory is not as definitive as predicting 
something new and then observing it (hypothesis-testing), but quite common in the physical 
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sciences (including geology, evolutionary biology, and cosmology). Regardless of the point at 
which theory is developed, validity issues must be addressed to make claims about the opera-
tion of the generative mechanism, particularly issues concerning measurement validity, internal 
validity, ecological validity, and external validity. These will now be discussed.
5.1 Measurement validity
In the terminology of critical realism, measurement validity is an assessment of whether the 
partial and perspectival empirical data collected under research conditions is an empirical trace 
of the actual events of research interest that operate below the empirical surface. Assessing meas-
urement validity in this social research context requires evidence of a valid connection between 
what can be observed empirically (say the number of interactions required to perform a task) 
and what the information systems community agrees (consensually) to be the actual experience.
The key feature of this formulation of measurement validity is that it relates empirical traces 
to real events rather than to theoretical ideas. An important insight is that since the domain of 
actual events is underspecified by their empirical traces, measurement validity cannot be estab-
lished simply by statistical analysis of the empirical traces themselves. Other procedures must be 
employed to demonstrate the connection of what is measured to what is occurring is the separate 
ontological domain of the actual, that is, to uncover the meaning of the data for actual events. 
For the specific case we are examining here, we want at least one indicator of programming 
quality, potentially more if quality is a complex and multidimensional concept. Some indicators 
may be quantitative (e.g., number of interactions required to perform a task). For these measures 
it is reasonable that each quantitative measure be assessed using standard construct development 
practices that have emerged from the community of practice of researchers in our field (e.g., 
Lewis et al. 2005). Other indicators may be verbal or visual, collected by observing the types of 
activities performed during development and asking our surrogate employees about particular 
attitudes. These activities will create a line of evidence so that we have confidence that we are 
measuring programming quality. 
5.2 Internal validity
Internal validity means establishing that the actual events that occur in the controlled domain 
are caused only by the generative mechanism that the theory proposes. The putative generative 
mechanism our hypothetical researcher proposes is that the effort-reward system is triggered by 
the method of payment on the fixed price contract (whether it is before work commences or 
after completion). The data gathered, particularly manipulation checks, should allow us to assess 
whether the laboratory events are consistent with the operation of this generative mechanism, 
at least in a well-defined statistical sense. Indeed, the patterns of data will have been predicted 
ahead of time and then triangulated by the measures of objective behaviour, attitudes (quantita-
tive) and perceptions (verbal). We still, of course, need to eliminate explanations involving alter-
native generative mechanisms (e.g., prior experience, and so on) so that we can establish whether 
differences in outcomes are observed as a result of the operation of the effort-reward system. 
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Bear in mind, however, that in critical realism terms, the manipulation of the payment 
method is at the empirical level. This manipulation, therefore, is not the actual variable that is 
involved in the dynamics of the effort-reward system; it merely instantiates the initial conditions 
required for that generative mechanism to play out its dynamics. If the conditions are set in one 
way, these dynamics should lead to a lower mean quality of product produced. Further, the real 
entity that is the concern of the study, the effort-reward system, is not observable directly but 
real, although we can observe some aspects of specific instances of events, and it can perhaps be 
manipulated by changing the payment method. This is why part of the task of demonstrating 
internal validity must be to show that the manipulation controls the variable that triggers the 
mechanism. 
5.3 Ecological validity
Ecological validity refers to the strength of evidence that the mechanism that causes the events 
in the research environment is the same as the theorised mechanism for the phenomenon as it 
occurs in the natural open systems within the practical problem domain. For the programming 
domain problem, providing a naturalistic work area, requirements documentation, and work 
contract may make the environment appear natural to the experimenter, but it is evidence from 
the participants that ultimately matters. 
5.4 External validity
External validity means that the generative mechanism that explains events within the con-
structed environment of the study also explains phenomena outside of the study, particularly in 
the broader domain of practice about which research questions are usually formulated. In the 
context of our case, external validity means assembling evidence that the putative effort-reward 
system proposed is found in a natural environment and can explain other outcomes. For exam-
ple, we could look at other environments where an effort-reward system governs behaviour, and 
the how our effort-reward mechanism can explain outcomes in those other environments. 
This last point is crucial and is a point that seems to be missed often by researchers in our 
discipline, resulting in ultimately irrelevant studies (sometimes even published in top journals) 
that are internally valid but not externally valid. It is also the motivation behind some extended 
discourses on this problem including (Lee and Baskerville 2003; Seddon and Scheepers (2006). 
Because our research is human-centered research, we must ensure that our design allows us to 
extrapolate beyond the study to humans in the general domain of practice, otherwise the effect 
of the generative mechanism may not be the same. More importantly the mechanism may not 
be the same. For example, if the group recruited has quite different values to the typical experi-
enced professional programmer, the effort-reward system may operate quite differently. That is, 
if the mechanism of interest is activated, the outcomes are unique to that group (for example, 
the post-paid group might produce programs that are only activated once payment is received). 
Therefore, recruitment (and screening) procedures are vital, as are more subtle issues, such as 
ensuring that each participant has the required skills.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper our aim was to show that new clarity can be brought to the formulation of the tra-
ditional validity issues of theory testing research in IS by explaining the fundamental principles 
of each issue in the language of critical realism. The separation of the vague and undifferentiated 
notion of theory into the three specific types of theory we have described clarifies the research 
process by showing how each is necessary to model the traces, events, structures, and causal 
mechanisms present in the different layers of the ontology. Our reformulation of the four types 
of validity described provides clarity regarding meaning and assessment of the traditional valid-
ity issues relevant to theory testing in practice-oriented IS research. 
Applying critical realism to each validity issue has provided important new insights. Meas-
urement validity concerns whether the partial and perspectival empirical data collected under 
research conditions are generated by, and describe in an adequate form (for the purposes of the 
research), the actual events of interest that operate below the empirical surface. Consequently 
the researcher must be concerned with establishing that the data collected represent the underly-
ing actual event variables both structurally and meaningfully. Since the category of the actual is 
distinct and larger that the empirical this cannot be established entirely by analysis of empirical 
data, but is now seen as a theory-laden process (note that this gives a theoretical justification 
to construct validation procedures already described in the IS literature, such as Lewis et al. 
(2005)).
Internal validity means establishing that the actual events that occur in the controlled do-
main are caused by the generative mechanism that the theory proposes. This requires the re-
searcher to compare the events which follow from the purported generative with those revealed 
by the empirical data as in the hypothetico-deductive method, but also to ensure alternative 
possible generative mechanisms for the events are eliminated. 
Ecological validity is the strength of evidence that the theorised mechanism for a phenom-
enon in the domain of practice was activated in the research environment in a way that is reflec-
tive of practice, for example, by setting the study in an environment that mimics the natural 
setting of the proposed generative mechanism. This requires the researcher to construct both 
the setting and experimental controls so that the generative mechanism of interest is allowed to 
operate while excluding (or nullifying) the effect of other mechanisms that could affect results.
External validity involves establishing that the generative mechanism that explains events 
within the study also causes phenomena outside of that setting, particularly in the broader 
domain of practice about which research questions are usually formulated. This means that the 
research manipulations that occur in the controlled research situation should invoke the same 
generative mechanism that produces the phenomena we wish to explain. 
Our systematic exploration of the consequences of critical realism for validity provides sever-
al novel contributions to theory over those derived from empiricism, which tends to inform for-
mal discussion of these issues. External validity is essentially undefined under hard empiricism 
since the latter does not support a concept of an external world of practice to which the concept 
refers. This has led IS researchers to supplement empiricism in ad hoc ways with realist notions, 
with confusing results. The notion from critical realism of generative mechanisms, and the new 
interpretation of theory testing, brings new clarity to this issue and validity in general. The 
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notion that the generative mechanisms that are invoked in contrived research situations must 
equate to those that operate under ambient circumstance is particularly novel and important. 
It provides a new razor by which research can be judged as relevant and important to practice. 
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